LAS VEGAS — Unmanned aerial drones equipped with electronic-warfare devices could jam radio frequencies and knock out wireless communications at restricted-access industrial facilities such as power plants and refineries, a security expert said at the Black Hat 2016 security conference here last week. Operators of factories, refineries, power plants and similar large facilities, which increasingly rely upon wireless sensors and communications, know how to defend against ground-based adversaries, said Jeff Melrose, a technology strategist with Yokogawa Electric, a Japanese maker of industrial sensors and controls. But these industrial facilities aren't ready for drone attacks. "An attacker normally has to get close, and we have a two-mile fence around our plant," Melrose said. "But even hobbyist drones can travel three miles, can tailgate people and can maneuver inside buildings." To illustrate the dangers of electronic jamming and powerful electronic signals, Melrose cited previous known incidents.

In the late 1980s, powerful radar scanners at a Dutch naval base triggered a nearby gas pipeline to rupture; a large valve had been opening and shutting in sync with the radar's frequency. In 1999, U.S. Navy radar tests disrupted water and gas distribution valves in the city of San Diego. Eight years later in 2007, the same city was subject to accidental electronic attack when a Navy radio-jamming exercise in the harbor made cellphones, pagers, GPS systems and even ATMs fail. In 2013, the FCC fined a New Jersey truck driver who had unintentionally disrupted flight takeoffs and landings at Newark Airport for months. The driver didn't want his boss to know he was taking naps in his truck, and had used an illegal GPS jammer to disable his truck's tracker. Except for the New Jersey one, all these involved powerful transmissions at significant distance. However, Melrose pointed out, a drone with a much weaker transmitter could achieve similar results at short range. He calculated that at about 25 feet, a pocket-sized jammer (illegal in the United States, but available overseas) could have the same effect on a wireless device as the 2007 naval test did upon the city of San Diego.

It's pretty hard for a person with a jammer to hop a fence and move about an industrial facility's grounds without being detected. But, Melrose said, the DJI Phantom 4 drone, released in March, can travel at 45 mph for up to 25 minutes and be controlled for up to three miles away. storm drone 6 instructionsIt would be difficult to stop one flying over the fence and moving rapidly toward a target on the grounds.parrot ar drone ios 6 "For the people in my industry," Melrose said, "these things are just showing up, and they just don't know how to deal with them."parrot ar drone 200 One drawback for the drone operator is that the jammer can knock out the drone's own GPS navigation and radio controls. ar drone power edition occasion

But that's easily solved, Melrose said: just put the jammer on a tether that's long enough to dangle out of effective range below the drone. He showed video clips in which a drone dangling a tethered object hovered still above stationary objects on the ground, or tracked and followed moving vehicles and individuals.buy skynet drone Another scenario might be to fly a small drone over a facility, land it on a rooftop or someplace else on the grounds where it might be hard to spot, and only then turn on the jammer. ar drone 1 prixIf properly positioned, the jammer would be able to knock out transmissions from two or more transmitters until plant security was able to locate it.parrot ar drone service "One weakness of drones is that they're loud and sound like drones," Melrose admitted.

"But there's a problem with listening for them — people in plants are often wearing ear protection routinely." To defend against possible electronic-jammer drone attack, Melrose recommended that plants put wireless devices on mesh networks rather than the traditional hub-and-spoke networks. Mesh networks, in which nearby devices communicate with each other instead of only with a central base station, are more robust and quicker to "heal." He also recommended wireless repeaters to increase range, and even using reflective surfaces such as storage tanks to bounce signals around.Skip to Navigation Skip to Content Home > AWIN_Defense > DroneShield Unveils Drone Jamming ‘Gun’ DroneShield Unveils Drone Jamming ‘Gun’ A developer of commercially available unmanned aircraft detection systems has unveiled a portable rifle-style jammer that blocks video and forces the drone to land safely and without ... THIS CONTENT REQUIRES SUBSCRIPTION ACCESS You must have an Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN) account or subscribe to this Market Briefing to access "DroneShield Unveils Drone Jamming ‘Gun’".

Not currently a subscriber? Click on the "Learn More" button below to view subscription offers. Please or to post comments. Copyright © 2017 Penton Sponsored Introduction Continue on to (or wait seconds) ×Threat from Russian UAV jamming real, officials say Russia’s advanced jamming and electronic warfare capabilities are well known. The conflict in eastern Ukraine involving Russian-backed separatists, who are taking advantage of Russian capabilities and assistance, and the Ukrainian armed forces is providing the U.S. military a unique lens to examine Russia’s capabilities. “We’re learning an awful lot from the environment in Ukraine, both the capabilities we’ve seen the Russians display in Crimea — electronic warfare capability at a tactical level that we absolutely don’t have,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, commanding general for U.S. Army Europe, said earlier this year. In one of the more startling displays of Russia’s capabilities, they have disrupted the unmanned aerial vehicles tasked by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine to chart the conflict.

The OSCE SMM monitors the security situation on the ground involving the separatists and Ukrainian army detailing ceasefire violations, shelling and acts of aggression. This development was first reported by Foreign Policy in October. According to their report, long-range UASs as part of the SMM were suspended in August following a series of hostile acts undermining the mission’s UAS operations and strength. These UAS were disrupted via surface-to-air missiles and military-grade electronic jamming, Foreign Policy reported. “The Mission’s UAV strength has been severely undermined during last several months," an OSCE spokesperson told C4ISRNET in an emailed message. "Apart from long-range UAVs, our mid-range and mini-UAVs were targeted during that time as well.” The specific long-range aircraft affected were the Austrian-made “I truly believe that Schiebel was out of their depth in this one,” Foreign Policy quoted a former senior OSCE official. “Live fire and GPS jamming were the two main factors for the loss of the drones.

The units did not have the capabilities to resist jamming … Schiebel may not be the only drone provider wary of going toe-to-toe with hostile adversaries armed with military-grade equipment.” It is unclear the types of measures OSCE took to secure this aircraft from Russian jamming attempts. “The tender to renew the contract for UAVs failed because the two leading companies in the tender process would not sign the negotiated contract after the series of shooting downs,” a spokesperson from the organization told C4ISRNET. “Subsequent to the failure of the tender, a temporary contract agreement with the service provider was reached. At no stage di[d] the OSCE suspend its UAV operations but in August, the service provider withdrew unilaterally, breaching the contract.” Many of these threats were evident in recent world events, most notably in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Susan Thornton, chair of the NATO Air Force Armaments Group and director of Information Dominance Programs Organization within the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, said at the annual Association of Old Crows annual symposium in November.

One of the primary lessons learned from the annexation of Crimea is how the Russians used EW, she continued, adding it was really a game changer for NATO because Russia’s capability suggested high levels of investment and planning. During this campaign, Thornton said they witnessed the jamming of communications to deny services, and the spoofing of GPS systems forcing Ukrainian forces to use maps as well as cyber attacks against UAVs. Moreover, it is unclear if U.S. systems could be susceptible to similar capabilities or if U.S. systems have undergone the proper hardening to thwart jamming. Despite Hodges' comments regarding U.S. observations of Russia’s capabilities in eastern Europe, U.S. Army Europe told C4ISRNET that it was not in a position to comment as its mission in Ukraine is in the western portion of the country with no personnel in the conflict zone with direct knowledge of the situation. Similarly, given the highly sensitive nature of EW, the Army’s new cyber directorate in the Pentagon, which encompasses cyber, EW and other similar elements, declined to comment along with the office of the Secretary of Defense.

Additionally, the Ukrainian defense ministry did not respond for a request to comment. “I would say that we’re aware of the ability to try to attack our command and control of the asset and also its position, navigation, timing — so it’s ability to sense where it is,” Brig. Gen. Edward Sauley, deputy director of operation for Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations and the mobilization assistant to the Director of Operations for Strategic Command told C4ISRNET at the AOC symposium. “So the techniques and focuses on trying to defend both our command and control and PNT are separate but related. We are aware of those and advancing both.” In terms of hardening U.S. assets, Sauley declined to provide any details. He did, however, offer that the possibility of jamming UASs is a real threat and a consideration the force is trying to address. For their part, the Marines Corps said their “small tactical UAS is employing basic safeguards and protections across the EM spectrum as well as assessing and developing qualifying solutions to enable mitigation for emerging and advanced EW threats.”

From a general force protection standpoint, this issue comes down to basic battle management. “If you’re just static in one piece of the spectrum of course they’re going to target it and you’re going to get jammed,” Marine Corps Lt. Col. Jeffery Kawada, deputy director of information Warfare Integration Division at HQ Marine Corps Capability Development Command, said. “But if you can maneuver in the spectrum and you can sense that and you can maneuver to a clean part of the spectrum — that’s the intent of everything we’re doing … being able to do dynamic spectrum access … we know we’re going to get jammed because we’re doing it to them.” This is just tactics 101, he continued; “you’re not going to attack the strong spot. If he’s hitting you here, if you could just go around them [and] that would be the tactic.” Kawada said the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, which outlines the acquisition requirements that go into a particular system, such as UAS, define basic security protections to guard against things like cyberattacks and electronic attacks.

The force is “absolutely” learning from observations of events in eastern Ukraine as they apply to Russian capabilities, Sauley said. While the invasion of Crimea and meddling in eastern Ukraine was a “very watershed event,” he clarified it might not have been all that startling from a pure electronic warfare knowledge base. Many experts, he said, were likely aware of the capability extent that existed from the Russians, but “it’s more an awareness across leadership in the military that we need to pay more attention to.” In light of advanced capabilities demonstrated by Russia, as well as other near-peer competitors, the U.S. has stood up several offices and projects aimed at countering these capabilities such as the Strategic Capabilities Office within OSD, the Army’s Rapid Capabilities Office and the so-called Third Offset Strategy, aimed at countering the parity adversaries have reached with the U.S. through a series of research and development projects in autonomy